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NOTES
OMNIPOTENT OR IMPOTENT? THE CURATOR'S
ROLE IN SEPARATION AND DIVORCE
Introduction
Dissolution of marriage by divorce presents a multitude of prob-
lems which have far-reaching effects on individuals, families, and
society as a whole. Louisiana courts traditionally have maintained that
the great interests of society dictate that "marriage relations should
be surrounded by every safeguard, and their severance allowed only
for the causes specified by the law, and clearly proven."' Based upon
this preservation of societal interests, divorce may be viewed as a
somewhat unique proceeding which the courts may be hesitant to ex-
pand upon absent express authority. A particularly enigmatic problem
is posed for the judiciary when the spouse seeking divorce has been
judicially interdicted: does a third party have the right or authority
to institute the personal action on the interdict's behalf? Although
the powers and duties of the curator, who is appointed to care for
and represent the interdict, are worded in rather general terms, the
court may hesitate to adopt an expansive interpretation of these
powers when the purpose of the curator's actions is to assume
authority to institute an admittedly unique and personal action. While
there has been some limited indication that the noninterdicted spouse
may have relief in the form of divorce,2 the interdict's right to in-
stitute divorce proceedings through a curator remains unaddressed
by either the Louisiana Legislature or courts.
In assessing the interdict's right of access to the judiciary through
his curator, the different types of interdiction in Louisiana, along with
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Halls v. Cartwright, 18 La. Ann. 414, 415 (1866).
2. See Ridell v. Hyver, 215 La. 358, 40 So. 2d 785 (1949). The parties were separated
in 1935, and Mr. Hyver was admitted to East Louisiana State Hospital nearly a year
later. Mr. Hyver was not formally interdicted until twelve years after the original
physical separation. In reversing the district court's dismissal of the divorce suit brought
by Mrs. Hyver, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that "the separation must be volun-
tary at its inception and that, if one of the parties becomes insane after such volun-
tary separation, the insanity does not preclude, prevent, or bar the granting of a
divorce." 215 La. at 365-66, 40 So. 2d at 787. See also Adams v. Adams, 408 So. 2d
1322 (La. 1982). Mrs. Adams initially left the matrimonial domicile after Mr. Adams
choked her and threatened her with a machete. Mr. Adams was committed that same
day, and Mrs. Adams told both her sister-in-law and her husband's probation officer
that she had no intention of staying with him. The supreme court, in granting Mrs.
Adams' divorce request, held that "from the point in time that a party evidences an
intention to terminate the marital association, when coupled with actual physical separa-
tion, the statutorily required separation period begins to run. And that is so regardless
of the cause of the initial physical separation." 408 So. 2d at 1327.
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the extent to which such interdictions curtail procedural capacity, must
be analyzed. In addition, the general authority and duties of the
curator should be examined, as well as the statutory grounds for
obtaining a divorce. Regardless of whether the curator is allowed to
initiate the divorce proceeding, alternatives such as partition of com-
munity property and support pending suit for separation or divorce
should be considered.
Louisiana Jurisprudence
The curious case of Cory v. Cory3 presented the Louisiana Second
Circuit Court of Appeal with the question of whether a curator had
authority to file suit for separation or divorce on behalf of an inter-
dict. In Cory, the plaintiff wife and her husband were married in Loui-
siana and remained in the state for about two years before moving
to California in the late 1940's. Mrs. Cory slowly lost her mental
faculties because of a degenerative brain disease, and in 1977 she
returned to Louisiana where her sister, a registered nurse, had agreed
to care for her. Mrs. Cory's sister instituted interdiction proceedings
and was appointed curatrix. In June of 1979, the curatrix instituted
separation proceedings' based on abandonment, cruel treatment, and
nonsupport;' alternatively, she sought a divorce based on voluntarily
living separate and apart for one year.6 The trial court granted a
separation and award of alimony pendente lite' on the grounds of aban-
donment under the provisions of Civil Code article 143.8 The second
circuit reversed, opining that the elements of abandonment had not
been established.' The trial court had held (and the second circuit
3. 395 So. 2d 937 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
4. While the jurisdictional concerns of Cory present timely issues involving the
domicile of an interdict and her nonresident husband, consideration of these issues
is deferred, as it is beyond the scope of this note.
5. LA. CIV. CODE art. 138.
6. LA. R.S. 9:301 (Supp. 1979).
7. LA. CiV. CODE art. 148:
If the spouse has not a sufficient income for maintenance pending suit for separa-
tion from bed and board or for divorce, the judge may allow the claimant spouse,
whether plaintiff or defendant, a sum for that spouse's support, proportioned to
the needs of the claimant spouse and the means of the other spouse.
8. LA. CIV. CODE art. 143:
Separation grounded on abandonment by one of the parties can be admitted only
in the case when he or she has withdrawn himself or herself from the common
dwelling, without a lawful cause, has constantly refused to return to live with
the other, and when such refusal is made to appear in the manner hereafter
directed; provided, however, that separation grounded on abandonment may be
the object of a reconventional demand in any suit for separation from bed and
board.
9. In holding that abandonment had not been established, the second circuit found
that Mr. Cory, although legally blind, supported his family by his work at concession
1020 [Vol. 43
NOTES
affirmed) that a divorce could not be granted based on living one year
separate and apart,"0 because a separation was not considered to be
voluntary where either spouse was insane at the time of separation."
In Cory, the issue of the power of the curator to institute separa-
tion and divorce proceedings was pretermitted by the plaintiffs failure
to establish statutory grounds of abandonment and the court's view
that the separation was not "voluntary." In light of the Adams v.
Adams" holding that separation need be voluntary only as to one of
the spouses, courts soon may have to answer squarely the question
of whether curators may institute divorce proceedings based upon suf-
ficient statutory grounds. Louisiana has no specific provisions allow-
ing curators or guardians to institute separation and divorce pro-
ceedings, nor is there any jurisprudence directly addressing the mat-
ter. Resolution of the divorce issue in cases where the petitioning
spouse has been judicially interdicted must therefore be based on case
analogy and interpretation of a broad spectrum of laws dealing with
divorce, curators, and incompetents, as well as the nature of the right.
History of Divorce in Louisiana"
While society traditionally has expressed a strong interest in the
preservation and perpetuation of marriage, this strong interest may
have weakened. A review of the evolution of Louisiana's divorce laws
reflects a general trend of diminution of the waiting periods before
obtaining divorce and a gradual relaxation of the legislative attitude
toward divorce. Divorce was not available under the general laws of
Louisiana until 1827 and then only pursuant to a legislatively recog-
stands in public buildings. Although his income totaled only about $400 monthly, he
sent a check to the curator every month to assist in his wife's care. Mr. Cory even
made the long journey from California on one occasion to visit his wife, but the trip
was terminated when a brother of Mrs. Cory forced him to leave the property. Under
these facts, there was no intent shown by Mr. Cory to abandon his wife.
10. LA. R.S. 9:301 (Supp. 1979): "When the spouses have been living separate and
apart continuously for a period of one year or more, either spouse may sue for and
obtain a judgment of absolute divorce."
11. But see Adams v. Adams, 408 So. 2d 1322 (La. 1982). In Adams the court held
that a separation, when evidenced by an intention to terminate the marital associa-
tion, need be voluntary only on the part of one of the parties to comply with the
requirements of LA. R.S. 9:301, regardless of the cause of the separation. Although
the facts are distinguishable (Mr. Adams was not formally interdicted, and the inter-
dicted spouse in Adams did not seek the divorce), the Adams court's statement regard-
ing the nature of voluntariness will have a direct impact on situations like that in
Cory. Hence, while the holding of Cory is undoubtedly correct, the statement that
a separation is involuntary where either spouse is insane now appears to be overbroad.
12. 408 So. 2d 1322 (La. 1982).
13. For a more thorough treatment of this subject, see R. PASCAL & K. SPAHT,
LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE 101-103 (2d ed. 1979).
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nized cause. The Revised Civil Code of 1870 recognized adultery and
felony conviction of the other spouse as grounds for immediate
divorce,14 but it imposed a minimum one-year waiting period if the
divorce was sought following a period of legal separation. 5 Act 25
of 1898 provided the initial authority for the at-fault spouse to obtain
a divorce after a judicial declaration of separation from bed and board,
but until 1916, the at-fault spouse was still precluded from seeking
the initial separation." Although the period of physical separation
required was seven years, Act 269 of 1916 was the first provision
allowing a separation without a showing of fault by either spouse.
The time periods required for divorce have gradually diminished
until today only a one-year period of physical separation" or a six-
month period following the judgment of legal separation 8 need be
shown to obtain a final divorce. Earlier Louisiana court decisions ex-
pressed a reverential attitude toward the sanctity of marriage, noting
that "it is in the great interest of society that the conjugal relation
should not be dissolved except upon weighty and well established
reasons."'9 The same philosophy may no longer hold true, however,
as along with the weakening societal interest in preserving the mar-
riage, as expressed by the legislature, emerges an interest of the in-
dividual which may be so significant as to be entitled to constitutional
protection.
Divorce as a Fundamental Right
The United States Supreme Court has increasingly recognized the
right of parties to marry without unnecessary interference by the
state. The modern era of Supreme Court cases treating marriage
began with Loving v. Virginia,"0 in which the Court found a Virginia
antimiscegenation statute unconstitutional on both equal protection
and due process grounds. In dictum, discussing the due process argu-
ment, the Court noted that the "freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men."'" This oft-cited language has been
used to support the theory that marriage is a fundamental right,"
14. LA. CIV. CODE art. 139.
15. LA. CIV. CODE art. 139 (as it appeared prior to 1954 La. Acts, No. 618, S 1).
16. 1916 La. Acts, No. 216, S 1. (amending LA. CIv. CODE art. 139).
"17. LA. R.S. 9:301 (Supp. 1979).
18. LA. R.S. 9:302 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1982 La. Acts, No. 348.
19. Scott v. Scott, 27 La. Ann. 594, 596 (1875).
20. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. Id. at 12.




but the actual holding of Loving was only that "restrictions on marital
choice based explicitly on race are unconstitutional" as violative of
equal protection.' The Court appears to have taken the final necessary
step in granting "fundamental right" status to marriage in Zablocki
v. Redhail.U In striking down a Wisconsin statute which required court
approval prior to the marriage of those persons under child support
obligations, the Court noted its earlier decisions respecting the im-
portance and value of marriage and reaffirmed the fundamental
character of the right to marry, holding that "[w]hen a statutory
classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamen-
tal right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently
important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests."' In Boddie v. Connecticut,' the plaintiffs were denied access
to divorce because they could not afford the court costs and fees re-
quired by state law. The Court recognized the importance of the mar-
riage relationship and the "concomitant state monopolization" of the
only legal means of dissolving the relationship; the Court held that
"due process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of
inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial
dissolution of their marriages."27 In Sosna v. Iowa,28 the plaintiff
challenged Iowa's one-year residency requirement for obtaining a
divorce on both due process and equal protection grounds, claiming
that the requirement interfered with both the right to interstate travel
and access to divorce. In denying relief, the Court found that the
residency requirement did not preclude access to the courts for pur-
poses of obtaining a divorce; the residency requirement merely delayed
this access. The Court held that since Iowa had asserted a strong
basis for the requirement, i.e., that it not become a divorce mill for
neighboring states and that litigants have sufficient attachment to the
state before being entitled to access to its courts, the residency
requirement fell within permissible constitutional parameters. Accord-
ing to the rationales of Boddie and Sosna, states may justify regula-
tion of divorce if such regulations further a sufficiently strong state
interest. While the state clearly has an interest in preserving the
family unit, such an interest may not warrant arduous restrictions
on the ability to obtain a divorce. The state's characterization of the
role of the family unit as essential wanes in the face of evidence that
the marriage has irretrievably broken down" or is no longer viable.
23. Id. at 953.
24. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
25. Id. at 388.
26. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
27. Id. at 374.
28. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
29. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT S 302 (1973).
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The state's justification that regulating divorce promotes general moral-
ity is less supportable in light of increasing recognition of personal
autonomy and freedom of life styles."0 State and societal interest in
promoting the family and preserving public morals may give way to
individual autonomy and the rights both to be left alone in one's
private affairs and to make decisions without government
interference. 1 If the right to marry is a fundamental right, it logically
follows that until the right to divorce is equally recognized, the ability
to fully exercise the right of marriage has been greatly impaired. The
Court noted in United States v. Kras32 that the "Boddie appellants'
inability to dissolve their marriages seriously impaired their freedom
to pursue other protected associational activities"' and suggested that
the most fundamental of these interests was the right to remarry.'
If the right to marry (or remarry) is based upon a fundamental freedom
of associational interests, this right also may impliedly include the
right to choose not to continue to associate," regardless of whether
the motivation is remarriage. Alternatively, the individual's interest
in both privacy and freedom of association suggests recognition of
divorce as a right worthy of significant constitutional protection.
The Boddie and Sosna holdings illustrate the constitutional prob-
lems triggered by state requirements imposed upon divorce. In Bod-
die, the interest of the state in insuring that court costs were paid
was insufficient to justify a blanket denial of procedural access to
divorce by indigents. Conversely, the Iowa regulation was justified
in Sosna by a significant state interest in both assuring the requisite
attachment to the state and avoiding the flood of litigants from other
states seeking refuge in a more desirable forum. Based on these deci-
sions, it appears that the Court has failed to adopt a clear standard
of review. The determination of a divorce statute's constitutional
validity necessarily will involve an analytical balancing-weighing the
state's interest in regulating divorce procedures against the in-
dividual's interest in obtaining relief. Applying such a balancing test,
it appears that the individual's interest frequently will outweigh that
of the state, particularly when the state attempts to deny access to
30. See Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977); see also Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 535 n.7 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
31. See Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1156, 1311 (1980); see also Olmstead, The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV.
216 (1960).
32. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
33. Id. at 444-45.
34. See Strickman, supra note 22, at 981.




divorce. While the state often can establish legitimate rationales for
restricting divorce, the regulations it imposes to effectuate its policies
must be narrowly drawn, for broad denials of the right to divorce
likely will be declared unconstitutional.
Interdiction and Powers of the Curator in Louisiana
In narrowing the present focus to the rights of the interdict in
divorce and separation proceedings, it is first necessary to examine
the Louisiana law on interdiction. Louisiana presently provides three
different statutory grounds for interdiction: interdiction for mental
incapacity," interdiction for physical infirmity, 7 and limited interdic-
tion for mental retardation, disability, or other infirmity.' The
language of Civil Code article 422 suggests that any incapacitating
physical infirmity is sufficient for a judicial declaration of interdiction;'
however, the jurisprudence consistently has construed the provision
as applicable only to those physical infirmities which also affect men-
tal capacity 40 such as senility," complete paralysis," and learning
disability." No reported cases reflect application of the article to in-
firmities which are purely and solely physical, having no effect on
mental capabilities. Although the courts have recognized the article's
apparent applicability to those physical disabilities involving no effect
on mental capacity, they have stopped short of applying it in that
vein." Regardless of judicial construction, the articles dealing with
the capacity and authority of a curator generally apply with equal
force to interdiction under both articles 389 (interdiction for mental
incapacity) and 422 (interdiction for "any infirmity"). Code of Civil Pro-
cedure article 684 denies the interdict procedural capacity to sue and
36. LA. CIv. CODE art. 389.
37. LA. CIV. CODE art. 422.
38. LA. CiV. CODE art. 389.1.
39. LA. CiV. CODE art. 422 states:
Not only lunatics and idiots are liable to be interdicted, but likewise all per-
sons who, owing to any infirmity, are incapable of taking care of their persons
and administering their estates.
Such persons shall be placed under the care of a curator, who shall be appointed
and shall administer in conformity with the rules contained in the present chapter.
40. Interdiction of Scurto, 188 La. 459, 177 So. 573 (1937).
41. Pons v. Pons, 137 La. 25, 68 So. 201 (1915).
42. Stokes v. Kemp, 186 La. 754, 173 So. 305 (1937).
43. State v. Williams, 392 So. 2d 641, 645 (1980) (Dixon, C.J., dissenting).
44. Succession of Connor, 165 La. 890, 891, 116 So. 223, 224 (1928): "The law allows
a formal interdiction for other causes than insanity, to wit, physical infirmities."
45. Louisiana courts might apply the article to purely physical disabilities when
provided with an appropriate factual setting. However, a review of the jurisprudence
offers no instances in which a Louisiana court has been presented with the oppor-
tunity to implement this approach.
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places this power in the hands of his curator." As no specific provi-
sion empowers the curator to institute divorce proceedings, analysis
of the curator's general powers under the Code of Civil Procedure
and the jurisprudence may provide insight as to the permissibility
of such action.
Code of Civil Procedure article 4550 provides, in part, that
"[w]ithin thirty days after the judgment of interdiction the court shall
appoint a curator for the person interdicted." Very few specific pro-
visions deal with the authority of the curator, but article 4554 pro-
vides that the rules applicable to the minor-tutor relationship are also
applicable to the relationship between incompetent and curator. Thus,
"the curator may exercise all procedural rights available to a litigant." 7
While article 4264, read in isolation, suggests a very broad scope of
powers available to the curator, his authority is not unlimited. Com-
ment (a) to article 4269 recognizes the fiduciary nature of the curator's
role in managing and preserving the property interests of the inter-
dict, while article 4271 requires the filing of a petition with recom-
mendations and reasons therefore when action is taken affecting the
interdict's interest. The codal articles on procedural capacity of the
curator are very general and provide little insight into the legislative
intent. When read in pari materia rather than individually, however,
a discernible scheme appears. Code of Civil Procedure article 4234
provides that mismanagement of the interdict's property is grounds
for removal of the curator;"s article 4262 instructs the curator to "take
possession of, preserve, and administer the [interdict's] property"; 41
46. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 684: "A mental incompetent does not have the pro-
cedural capacity to sue. Except as otherwise provided in Articles 4431, 4554, and 4557
the curator is the proper plaintiff to sue to enforce a right of an interdict."
47. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4264.
48. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4234:
The court may remove any tutor who is or has become disqualified; is a nonresi-
dent who has not appointed, or has left the state permanently without appoin-
ting, an agent to represent him as required by Article 4273; has become incapable
of discharging the duties of his office; has mismanaged the minor's property; has
failed to perform any duty imposed by law or by order of court; or if such removal
would be in the best interests of the minor.
The court on its own motion may order, and on motion of any interested
party shall order the tutor to show cause why he should not be removed from
office. If service of this order cannot be made on the tutor for any reason, the
court shall appoint an attorney at law to represent him, on whom service shall
be made and against whom the proceeding shall be conducted contradictorily.
The removal of a tutor from office does not invalidate any of his official acts
performed prior to his removal.
49. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 4262:
The tutor shall take possession of, preserve, and administer the minor's prop-
erty. He shall enforce all obligations in favor of the minor and shall represent
him in all civil matters. He shall act at all times as a prudent administrator, and
shall be personally responsible for all damages resulting from his failure so to act.
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article 4269 imposes a prudent administrator standard in the investing
and managing of the interdict's property; and article 4069 specifically
provides for a tutor for property only. In short, the bulk of the pro-
cedural articles emphasize the care and management of the interdict's
property, reflecting a legislative attitude that financial and property
concerns were a primary object of the legislation empowering the
curator. This primary concern is reflected in Civil Code articles 389
and 422, which implicitly require that the incompetent be unable to
manage his person and administer his property before interdiction
occurs.50 Where interdiction is imposed, the duties of administering
the interdict's property, as well as caring for his person, fall upon
the curator, who is appointed for that purpose. The care of the inter-
dict's person more appropriately might be left within the discretion
of the interdict's family (as it has been traditionally), particularly where
the interdict's personal affairs do not necessitate prompt action. The
administration of the interdict's estate, however, is better left with
one who is judicially determined to be competent to handle such mat-
ters and who is instructed and empowered to act in the interdict's
best interests.
In defining the incapacity requiring interdiction, the drafters could
have selected more appropriate language had the intent been to in-
clude a less severely impaired group which merely experienced dif-
ficulty in making personal decisions, as opposed to financial ones. Un-
doubtedly, such a group would be comprised of a large segment of
the population that is commonly considered rational but experiences
difficulty in personal life and relations. A more logical interpretation
consistent with the jurisprudence is that the statutory language was
chosen only after thoughtful deliberation, with the intent to provide
for the interdiction of those who had reached a point of such severe
incapacity that they could neither care for themselves physically and
emotionally nor protect their own financial and property interests.5'
Natural cotutors shall be bound in solido except as to damages arising from
the administration of all or a part of the minor's property by one of the cotutors
individually pursuant to an agreement between the cotutors approved by the court.
50. See In re Fabre, 371 So. 2d 1322 (La. 1979). LA. CIv. CODE art. 389 provides:
"No person above the age of minority, who is subject to an habitual state of imbecili-
ty, insanity or madness, shall be allowed to take care of his own person and administer
his estate, although such person shall, at times, appear to have the possession of his
reason." LA. CIV. CODE art. 422 is quoted in note 39, supra.
51. This contention is supported by the jurisprudence. To impose interdiction, the
court must find that the person both cannot administer his estate and cannot care
for his person. See Pons v. Pons, 137 La. 25, 68 So. 201 (1915) (noting the existence
of all the requisites for interdiction). See also In re Adams, 209 So. 2d 363 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1968) (finding that although Miss Adams [was] able to perform simple routine
chores, "a normal seven-year-old child was capable of doing these things;" the decree
of interdiction was warranted, as she could neither administer her estate nor take
care of her person).
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The minimum standards warranting interdiction under articles 389
and 422, however, are not inseparably linked with the procedural
authority the curator assumes. Combining the general articles on the
curator's authority with the codal language describing the status which
requires interdiction, one can infer that the curator, in the perfor-
mance of his duties, should be more concerned with the interdict's
finances and property than with the interdict's personal affairs.
Authority of the Curator to Institute the Divorce Action
The jurisprudence lends support to those who view the curator
as a guardian of the interdict's financial concerns. Louisiana courts
have recognized the curator's binding authority to defend the inter-
dict in a partition action, 2 to administer the incompetent's estate,O
and to pay the just debts of a deceased interdict.54 However, there
is a surprising scarcity of cases dealing with the authority to initiate
actions not motivated by pecuniary interest. This absence is consis-
tent with Planiol's view that the powers of the curator should be so
limited that he only can concern himself with the most indispensable
and urgent acts., The curator properly asserts himself when represent-
ing the interdict who has been sued or when administering an estate,
since failure to act to resolve these problems often may prove finan-
cially disastrous. Action for divorce, however, does not carry this sense
of financial urgency in all cases. While the raucous and improprietous
acts of one spouse might prove offensive or embarrassing to the other
spouse, there generally is no pending urgency to the dissolution pro-
ceeding. Indeed, the interdict (who is likely to be insulated from both
the offending spouse and society) should be relatively unaffected by
the personal conduct of others. In the event the interdict is not in
a position to remarry or embark upon new intimate personal rela-
tions, the failure to sever the matrimonial bonds is of little direct
consequence to him.w
Arguably, a sense of urgency is present as to at least one party
if the curator initiates the divorce action. Inherent dangers accom-
pany the grant to the curator of the power to seek divorce on behalf
of the interdict, for this power invites abuse. A curator granted power
52. Levenson v. Chancellor, 68 So. 2d 116 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953).
53. Converse v. Dicks, 179 La. 339, 154 So. 17 (1934).
54. In re Onorato, 46 La. Ann. 73, 14 So. 299 (1894).
55. 1 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, pt. 2, no. 2089 at 237 (11th ed. La. St.
L. Inst. trans. 1959).
56. Thus, if a primary concern in affording constitutional protection to the right
to divorce is the safeguarding of one's right to remarry, the interdict in this position
arguably is entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection.
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to seek divorce on behalf of the interdict might assert the action in
order' to provide for the financial welfare of the curator, rather than
the best interests of the interdict; e.g., the curator might be compen-
sated by ten percent of the revenues of the interdict's property." That
possibility suggests the withholding of such authority as the more
judicious choice.58 Since the interdicted spouse may be insulated or
incapable of expressing an attitude or of understanding the nature
of the other spouse's acts, there seems to be no requirement for
prompt action until the competent spouse begins to alienate community
assets, at which point the curator may act on behalf of the incompe-
tent to protect his financial concerns.
A particular problem arises in the context of appointing the
curator. Code of Civil Procedure article 455011 provides alternative
procedures for this appointment. A competent person may nominate
a curator to serve if he later becomes interdicted. If this curator is
not nominated by power of attorney or is for some reason disqualified,
the interdict's spouse would have preference over other parties in
the appointment of the curator. The appointment of the interdict's
spouse as curator gives rise to potential problems, especially where
the interests of those spouses living under the legal regime conflict
and one spouse controls the financial destiny of both. Under the recent-
ly enacted matrimonial regimes provisions," Louisiana provides for
57. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4274 & comment (c).
58. See Cory v. Cory, 395 So. 2d 937 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981). The family of Mrs.
Cory had never shown any liking for Mr. Cory and did not approve of the marriage.
In such a situation, the opportunity for Mrs. Cory's sister to impose her wishes upon
the interdict was clear, as she did by seeking the divorce almost immediately upon
being appointed curatrix. Similar problems arise in the context of the curator who
stands to benefit financially if a potential heir can be eliminated by divorce.
59. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4550:
Within thirty days after the judgment of interdiction the court shall' appoint
a curator for the person interdicted.
By power of attorney, a competent person may nominate the curator of his
person, of his property, or both, to serve should he be later interdicted. The court
shall appoint the person nominated upon his furnishing security and taking an
oath, as provided in Articles 4131, 4171, and 4554, unless he is disqualified or,
unless for some other reason, the court determines that the appointment would
not be for the best interest of the interdict.
If the curator is not nominated by power of attorney, or if the nominee is
not appointed, the spouse of an interdicted person has the prior right to be ap-
pointed curator.
If the interdict has no spouse or if the spouse does not apply for appointment
as curator within ten days after the judgment of interdiction, the court shall ap-
point the applicant best qualified, personally, and by training and experience, to
serve as curator. Article 4069 governs the appointment of a separate curator of
the property and person.
60. 1979 La. Acts 1979, No. 709, S 1.
19831 1029
0LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
equal management of community property: "Each spouse acting alone
may manage, control, or dispose of community property unless other-
wise provided by law."61 The spouse who is the sole manager of a
community enterprise has the exclusive right to alienate or encumber
its movables.2 Additionally, either spouse has the exclusive right to
manage, alienate, or encumber movables issued or registered in his
name,63 even though such movables may be community property. While
a standard of equal management of community property has been
advanced, 4 the equal management provisions actually extend only to
a limited class of nonregistered movables,65 for the concurrence of both
spouses is required for the alienation or encumbrance of registered
movables, community immovables, and all or substantially all of the
assets of a community enterprise.6 While either spouse may renounce
the right to concur in favor of the other spouse, 7 retention of the
right to concur does not necessarily fully protect a spouse, as each
spouse possesses individual authority to dispose of or alienate substan-
tial community assets. Not only does either spouse possess the capabili-
ty of alienating considerable assets, but Civil Code article 2355 allows
a spouse to seek judicial authorization to act without the concurrence
of the other upon showing, among other factors, that such concur-
rence cannot be obtained due to physical incapacity or mental in-
competence. In anticipation of problems involving the alienation of
community assets, Louisiana has provided some procedural safeguards.
Article 4550 allows the court to appoint as curator the applicant best
qualified if the spouse does not apply for appointment within ten days
of the judgment of interdiction. In any event, at the time the court
appoints a curator, the court also must appoint an undercurator.69 The
undercurator acts to protect the interests of the interdict by express-
61. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2346.
62. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2350. Article 2350 does not include movables issued in the
name of the other spouse or situations in which the concurrence of the other spouse
is required.
63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2351.
64. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2346, comment (a).
65. For a more detailed analysis of the matrimonial regimes legislation, see Riley,
Analysis of the 1980 Revision of the Matrimonial Regimes Law of Louisiana, 26 LoY.
L. REV. 453 (1980); Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Legislative
Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 83 (1979); Note,
Management of Community Assets: Incorporeal Movables, 42 LA. L. REV. 770 (1982).
66. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2347.
67. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2348.
68. While it is not entirely clear whether the court could arbitrarily refuse to
appoint the spouse if application is made, it appears that the court, under its broad
discretion to act in the best interests of the interdict, could refuse the application
if the spouses' interests conflicted. The court also may appoint a separate curator
for property. See LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 4069.
69. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4553.
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ing his concurrence or nonconcurrence in actions suggested by the
curator,0 as well as by intervening whenever the interests of the
curator and the interdict are opposed. If the undercurator fails to con-
cur, the court holds a contradictory hearing, thus assuring neutral
judicial intervention to seek the best interests of the interdict. The
interdicted spouse is further protected by the general rule that "a
spouse is liable for any loss or damage caused by fraud or bad faith
in the management of the community property."71 The protection af-
forded by this general rule, however, presupposes that the court will
intervene in disputes involving undissolved marriages-an attitude
which courts traditionally have been reluctant to assume. Thus, while
the law purports to bridle the discretion of the spouse appointed
curator, its impact and effectiveness, in view of the attitude adopted
by the courts, remains uncertain.
Limited Interdiction
The impact of Louisiana Civil Code article 389.1 is somewhat
unclear, as it is a new provision and there is no reported interpretive
jurisprudence. Arguably, the same procedural limitations apply to this
limited interdiction as apply to the more comprehensive interdiction
under articles 389 and 422.7 Were this true, however, there hardly
would be a need for a new provision; in fact, the judgment of limited
interdiction is specifically intended to grant the curator only limited
authority. Article 389.1 clearly calls for a curator with limited powers:
When a person is declared incapable by reason of mental
retardation, mental disability, or other infirmity under the provi-
sions of Articles 389 or 422 of the Louisiana Civil Code, of caring
for his own person or of administering his estate, a court of com-
petent jurisdiction may appoint a limited curator to such person
or his estate. Pending appointment of a limited curator, the court
shall inquire into the specific abilities and disabilities of the in-
capacited person and such limited curator shall have only those
powers necessary to provide for the demonstrated needs of the
incapacitated persons. The powers, duties, responsibilities, and any
liabilities of the limited curator shall be specifically set forth in
a judgment of limited interdiction.
The rights of the limited interdict shall be infringed in the least
restrictive manner consistent with his incapacities. A judgment
70. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 4202, 4553. This responsibility is not to be taken light-
ly. The undercurator may be liable to the interdict for the negligent performance of
his duties. See Angelloz v. Angelloz, 204 La. 988, 16 So. 2d 654 (1944).
71. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2354.
72. See text at note 46, supra.
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of limited interdiction shall not operate to deprive the in-
capacitated person of any civil right, the right to contract, or any
right pertaining to any license, permit, privilege, or benefit unless
specifically set forth in the judgment.
The interdiction under this article is certainly not intended to be as
comprehensive as that under articles 389 or 422, which removes vir-
tually all of the interdict's authority to exercise his civil rights.73 The
new provision envisions a person who is competent enough to make
many decisions and express opinions yet needs assistance in ad-
ministering an estate or handling certain affairs." Consistent with the
concept of infringing on this person's rights in the least restrictive
manner, the regulation of personal relations, absent a contrary decree
in the judgment of limited interdiction, would be left in the hands
of the interdict. In this fashion, the limited interdict could have a
limited curator who would act as a consultant or even a limited curator
who, although fully empowered to administer the concerns of his finan-
cial well-being, could in no way interfere with his right to seek a
divorce. Even if the limited curator is established specifically in the
decree as the procedural representative in all matters on behalf of
the limited interdict, such a declaration would not necessarily include
a suit for divorce filed by the curator. However, the curator should
be entitled to at least submit his petition and demonstrate that such
a suit would be in the best interests of the interdict. Prior to the
enactment of the limited interdiction provision, the parties faced an
all-or-nothing proposition. The person was either completely incompe-
tent and stripped of virtually all capacity or fully competent and vested
with complete capacity. The new provision recognizes that there is
a vast gap between complete incompetence and full capacity. In
recognizing this gap, Louisiana may adopt the approach of that Califor-
nia court which made an exception to the general bar against curators
instituting divorce proceedings when the spouse under conservator-
ship was shown to be capable of exercising a rational judgment and
expressing her wishes concerning termination of a marital
relationship."5 If, in the judgment of limited interdiction the court
grants the power to pursue all legal actions to the curator, the limited
curator clearly would be the proper procedural representative to assert
the action; conversely, if this power is not specifically set forth, arti-
cle 389.1 mandates that it not be denied to the limited interdict. The
language of the article suggests that the legislature intended that the
73. See generally Comment, Interdiction Reform: The Need for a Limited Interdic-
tion Article in the Louisiana Civil Code, 54 TUL. L. REV. 164 (1979).
74. Id. at 173.
75. In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897
(1973), overruled on other grounds, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976).
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rights of the interdict were to be preserved to the greatest possible
degree, and included within these rights may be access to the courts,
whether an action is initiated by the limited interdict or his curator
pursuant to the limited interdiction decree.
The question of whether an action for divorce can be maintained
pursuant to any of the three provisions for interdiction is hardly
crystalline. As Louisiana's courts have not clearly addressed this issue,
a survey of the solutions from other states and the social policies
reflected therein may be of some assistance.
Treatment by Other States"6
Of the twenty-three surveyed states which have dealt specifically
with the authority of a curator or guardian to initiate divorce pro-
ceedings on behalf of an interdict, the vast majority have noted that
in the absence of a specific statute, the curator is not allowed to do
so." Although most of these states grant to the interdict's guardian
or curator broad, vague procedural authority similar to that provided
for in Louisiana, the underlying rationale which frequently surfaces
suggests that a suit for divorce is one so strictly personal that only
the offended spouse should be able to prosecute it.78 The courts of
these states have offered diverse reasons for concluding that divorce
is such a unique and personal action as to preclude participation by
the curator: the offended spouse might condone the acts of the other
spouse,"9 one or both parties could be opposed to divorce based on
religious beliefs' (even though a spouse might be incapacitated to the
extent that he could not express such opposition), and the interdict
could be incapable of making a truly voluntary decision as to the ter-
mination of the relationship. 1 Many state courts continue to recognize
marriage as a highly-regarded institution to be left undisturbed in
the absence of specifically expressed legislative design: "The right
to divorce is not a common law right, but depends upon legislative
enactments."8 2 Only three states have ever recognized the authority
76. Although many states have adopted all or part of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, the act contains no specific provision regarding the curator's authority
to institute divorce. See generally UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT S 303(f) (1974): "The
court may join additional parties proper for the exercise of its authority to implement
this Act."
77. Scott v. Scott, 45 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1950). See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 681
(1966).
78. Cohen v. Cohen, 73 Cal. App. 2d 330, 166 P.2d 622 (1946).
79. Birdzell v. Birdzell, 33 Kan. 433, 6 P. 561 (1885).
80. Mohrmann v. Kob, 291 N.Y. 181, 51 N.E.2d 921 (1943).
81. Cox v. Armstrong, 122 Colo. 227, 221 P.2d 371 (1950).
82. State ex rel. Quear v. Madison Circuit Ct., 229 Ind. 503, 507, 99 N.E.2d 254,
255 (1951).
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of the curator to institute divorce proceedings -Massachusetts and
Rhode Island (by statute) and Alabama (through its jurisprudence).
(Although a lower New York court allowed appointment of a guar-
dian to initiate divorce proceedings on grounds of adultery, it is doubt-
ful that this court's approach would be generally followed in light of
earlier precedent from the state's highest court.)' Massachusetts
formerly allowed the libel for divorce to be signed by the guardian
of the person not of sound mind, 4 but this provision was repealed
in 1975,85 leaving Rhode Island as the only state with a statutory pro-
vision for this authority. The repeal of the Massachusetts provision
leaves the guardian with general procedural capacity to sue on behalf
of his ward,8" much like that granted in Louisiana 7 and other states.8"
While the broad terms of the current Massachusetts provision have
suggested to some that there truly has been no reduction of authori-
ty for the guardian or curator, 9 the legislative act of repeal and the
failure of any cases to surface more logically suggests that the
legislature intended to completely remove this authority from the
scope of the guardian's powers. Under Rhode Island General Law,
[e]very complaint [the divorce petition] shall be verified by the
plaintiff, if of sound mind and legal age to consent to marriage;
otherwise upon application to the court and after notice to the
party in whose name the complaint shall be filed, the court may
allow such complaint to be verified by a resident guardian or next
friend.'
Rhode Island expressly recognizes the authority of the guardian to
initiate divorce proceedings, yet no reported cases reflect application
of the statute to interdicts and curators.
The Alabama Supreme Court, in 1941, found statutory authority
for allowing the curator to act by reading that state's laws regarding
83. See text at note 102, infra.
84. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, S 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1969) (repealed 1975).
85. 1975 Mass. Acts 400, S 13.
86. MASS. ANN. LAWS R. Civ. P. 17(b) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1982).
87. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 4202, 4262, 4264.
88. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. S 387.060 (Baldwin 1982) provides: "A guardian shall have
the custody of his ward, and the possession, care and management of the ward's prop-
erty, real and personal. He shall provide for the necessary and proper maintenance
... of the ward out of the estate." See also GA. CODE ANN. S 29-2-1 (1982); TENN. CODE
ANN. S 34-401 (1977).
89. See Note, Incompetency and Divorce Laws: Protective or Defective, 83 DICK. L.
REV. 339, 345-46 (1979). Contra Schultz, Deciding Right to Die Cases Involving Incompe-
tent Patients: Jones v. Saikewicz, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 936, 948 (1977).
90. R.I. GEN. LAWS J 15-5-11 (1956). The complaint is the petition filed for divorce.
This statutory provision is located under chapter 5 of the Rhode Island Domestic Rela-
tion Law and applies specifically to divorce.
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guardians in pari materia with its laws of divorce, and the court did
allow the curator to institute divorce proceedings." Although the
majority opinion expressed no rationale for this departure from the
"rule sustained by the weight of authority,"92 a dissenting opinion im-
plied that the holding was based primarily on the social implications
involved. It was averred that the wife, subsequent to her husband's
interdiction, had remarried and reared a family of children. The dis-
sent noted that "[flor sound reasons of public policy, where the
legitimacy of children is involved, a presumption of the validity of
the second marriage is indulged.9 13 This decision may have been based
upon unique circumstances, but a later Alabama decision reflects the
state supreme court's hesitancy to depart from its earlier precedent94
and leaves Alabama as one of only several states which have addressed
the issue and allowed such liberal powers to the curator.
While these two Alabama decisions remain undisturbed, no subse-
quent reported cases have followed their approach. Massachusetts
clearly has reversed its position on the issue, and it is unclear how
the courts of Rhode Island will interpret its statute. The predomi-
nant trend, however, is towards withholding authority from the
curator.
Special Grounds for Divorce
The provisions regulating the powers of the curator emphasize
that person's obligation to act in the best interests of the incompetent.
Louisiana courts, in aiding the curator to achieve this goal, necessarily
must examine the content of these interests. Louisiana, under certain
circumstances, might be willing to follow the more liberal approach
granting power to the curator to institute divorce proceedings.
While Louisiana traditionally has recognized adultery and felony
conviction as grounds for simultaneous separation and divorce,99 the
more commonly recognized divorce is a two-step procedure initiated
by a period of legal separation and, if no reconciliation takes place,
followed by final divorce. Under modern Louisiana law, a one-year
period of physical separation is still generally required before divorce
is granted," although final divorce may be obtained six months after
a judgment of separation." Additionally, immediate divorce is available
91. Campbell v. Campbell, 242 Ala. 141, 5 So. 2d 401 (1941).
92. 242 Ala. at 142, 5 So. 2d at 401.
93. 242 Ala. at 143, 5 So. 2d at 403 (Bouldin, J., dissenting).
94. Hopson v. Hopson, 257 Ala. 140, 57 So. 2d 505 (1952).
95. See 1827 La. Acts, p. 130, S 4.
96. LA. R.S. 9:301 (Supp. 1979).
97. LA. R.S. 9:302 (1950), as amended by 1982 La. Acts, No. 348.
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in the case of adultery or felony conviction.98 As noted by Planiol,
[tihe stigma flowing from condemnation to a serious penalty falls
indirectly upon the spouse of the convict. It is proper that this
spouse, thus affected by the unworthiness of the convict, should
be able to obtain the rupture of the marriage and have nothing
more in common with such a spouse.9
This stigma attaches equally to the spouse of an adulterer. Civil Code
article 139 reflects society's condemnation of both these acts and pro-
vides the offended spouse with the opportunity to immediately ter-
minate the marital relationship. A further reflection of this social
opprobrium is suggested by the duty of fidelity contained in Civil Code
article 119.'00 As a specific obligation, fidelity apparently is viewed
as a desirable virtue necessary to maintain the marital relationship,
and departure therefrom is immediate cause for dissolution.
A lower New York court expressed this same attitude toward
adultery when "in the interests of justice," it allowed a guardian to
be appointed for an interdict so a divorce action could be prosecuted
on grounds of adultery.' 1 While New York previously had followed
the majority rule in disallowing a divorce action filed by a guardian,1"2
the court noted, "It cannot be presumed that the Legislature intended
to leave an insane spouse completely at the mercy of the other party
to the marriage contract, who might then with impunity disregard
marital obligations or successfully assert marital rights lost by
misconduct."10 3 The disdain of the New York court for adultery is
paralleled in Louisiana, where the legislature has long recognized
adultery, as well as felony conviction, as immediate grounds for
divorce. Divorce based upon the narrow statutory grounds of adultery
(or felony conviction) could provide the Louisiana courts with a basis
upon which to decline to follow the majority trend. However, even
if Louisiana fails to recognize divorce upon the grounds of adultery
98. LA. CIv. CODE art. 139.
99. 1 M. PLANIOL, supra note 55, no. 1171, at 651.
100. LA. Civ. CODE art. 119: "The husband and wife owe to each other mutually,
fidelity, support and assistance."
101. McRae v. McRae, 43 Misc. 2d 252, 250 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
102. The current position of New York is unclear. New York's highest court had
previously adhered to the majority trend in Mohrmann v. Kob, 291 N.Y. 181, 51 N.E.2d
921 (1943). The decision of McRae v. McRae, 43 Misc. 2d 252, 250 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup.
Ct. 1964), which allows the prosecution of the divorce action by an appointed guar-
dian, leaves an apparent conflict within the state, as the state's highest court has
not addressed the issue since Mohrmann; presumably, the high court's earlier Mohrmann
rationale remains valid.
103. McRae v. McRae, 43 Misc. 2d 252, 254-55, 250 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779 (Sup. Ct. 1964)
(citing Kaplan v. Kaplan, 256 N.Y. 366, 371, 176 N.E. 426, 427-28 (1931)).
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(much less any other cause) as actionable by a curator, the interdict
would not necessarily be without a remedy.
Other Options of the Curator
Although the curator may be barred from petitioning for divorce
on the interdict's behalf, feasible alternatives are available, particularly
where financial and property matters are the primary concern. As
previously noted, the provisions regarding the power of the curator
seem to be directed at protecting the financial security of the inter-
dict. In this context, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal found that
the curatrix was a proper party to assert an alimony claim on behalf
of her sister, who was interdicted subsequent to her divorce."4
Recognizing that the limits and scope of authority of the curator are
nebulous at best, the curator nevertheless may have viable options
consistent with the legislative goal of securing the interdict's finan-
cial stability. While the following illustrations of potential alternatives
are not intended to be an exclusive listing of the curator's options,
they do evidence a legislative design to provide solutions to the in-
terdict's problems. Civil Code article 136 specifically states that
"separation from bed and board does not dissolve the bonds of
matrimony." Since such a judgment does not terminate the marital
association, the courts might express a less reverential attitude
towards it and permit a curator to file a separation suit on behalf
of an interdict. In allowing the curator to institute the separation
action,' Louisiana would not be unique. Although New York generally
does not recognize the power of a curator to institute divorce
proceedings,' 6 the power to seek a judicial separation was recognized
in Kaplan v. Kaplan. ' The New York high court noted that the state's
statutory provisions did not expressly provide that an action for separa-
tion could be brought by an insane spouse through a guardian ad litem.
The court stated, however, that any cause of action in favor of an
infant or incompetent could be prosecuted by a guardian, and the court
then concluded that judicial separation was one such cause of action.
The court expressly withheld judgment on the question of whether
a divorce suit could be maintained by a guardian. The actions for
separation and divorce were distinguished based upon the fact that
actions for separation existed long before divorce was recognized. In
104. In re Williams, 288 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
105. Of course, the power of the curator to seek the judicial separation presup-
poses the existence of statutory grounds which could be pursued by a person of
competence.
106. See text at note 102, supra.
107. 256 N.Y. 366, 176 N.E. 426 (1931).
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addition, separation continues the marriage tie and allows enforce-
ment of the "marital obligation of support." ' Other states have
recognized the authority of a curator to set aside a decree of divorce,"9
as well as to institute annulment proceedings."' These decisions
recognize the fact that the curator must be able to protect one who
can not do so on his own behalf. Under Louisiana law, judicial separa-
tion might be a more desirable means of protecting the financial and
property interests of a spouse than divorce.
The judgment of separation from bed and board effects a dissolu-
tion of the community,"' entitling each spouse immediately to a parti-
tion of the community property."' The interdict who obtains a separa-
tion is assured by the provisions of Civil Code article 2357 that his
liability for debts incurred during the existence of the community
113
is limited to his share of the former community and that his separate
property may not be seized by any creditors unless he was the party
who incurred the debt. Article 2357 additionally protects the inter-
dicted spouse by discouraging the alienation of former community
property. Either spouse who disposes of property of the former com-
munity for any purpose other than the satisfaction of community
obligations is liable for all obligations incurred by the other spouse
up to the value of the property so alienated."' This general rule,
however, is subject to the modifications contained in the third
paragraph of Civil Code article 2357. Either spouse, by written act,
may assume responsibility for one-half the community obligations in-
curred by the other spouse. Under such a voluntary agreement, the
assuming spouse is free to dispose of former community property
without incurring additional liability for the debts incurred by the
other spouse.
A recent Third Circuit Court of Appeal decision supports the pro-
position that the curator may act to terminate the community existing
between the interdict and his spouse. In Hines v. Hines,"I the curator
representing the interdicted husband entered into a matrimonial agree-
108. 256 N.Y. at 370, 176 N.E. at 427.
109. Iago v. lago, 168 Ill. 339, 48 N.E. 30 (1897); Newman v. Newman, 42 Ill. App.
2d 203, 191 N.E.2d 614 (1963).
110. Johnson v. Johnson, 277 Ky. 623, 126 S.W.2d 1055 (1939); Duncan v. Duncan,
88 Ohio App. 243, 99 N.E.2d 510 (1950).
111. LA. CIv. CODE art. 155.
112. For a more thorough discussion of the partition of community property, see
Note, Termination of the Community, 42 LA. L. REv. 789 (1982).
113. Termination of the community pursuant to a judgment of separation from bed
and board is retroactive to the date on which the petition was filed. See LA. CiV. CODE
art. 155.
114. See generally LA. CIv. CODE art. 2357.
115. 419 So. 2d 971 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 431038
NOTES
ment dividing the community property and adopting a "separate
maintenance regime." The curator's action on behalf of the interdict
had been taken "with court approval.""' The matrimonial agreement
in Hines produced the same effects with respect to community prop-
erty as would termination of the community pursuant to legal
separation.
While the curator's actions in Hines effected a termination of the
community, the court did not treat the question of whether the curator
could represent the interdict in a suit for separation. One aspect of
a suit for separation that is not present in a Hines-type agreement
is alimony pendente lite:
If the spouse has not a sufficient income for maintenance pending
suit for separation from bed and board or for divorce, the judge
may allow the claimant spouse, whether plaintiff or defendant, a
sum for that spouse's support, proportioned to the needs of the
claimant spouse and the means of the other spouse." 7
Of course, alimony pendente lite is dependent upon the curator's ability
to initiate separation proceedings, even if he cannot file for divorce.
Once this right is established, the interdicted spouse, through a
curator, may seek maintenance based upon the mutual obligations of
support set forth in Civil Code articles 119 and 120.18 These mutual
obligations remain intact, since the marital ties are not dissolved upon
separation."9 The enforcement of the codal obligations, however, re-
quires a suit for legal separation or divorce. No provisions now exist
for the civil enforcement of these mutual obligations by the curator
of an interdicted spouse."
Conclusion
The problems faced by the interdicted spouse are unique. Loui-
siana has not committed itself to any inflexible standards and has the
116. Id. at 972.
117. LA. CIv. CODE art. 148.
118. See Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978). In Holliday the court said,
The right of the wife to seek alimony pendente lite does not depend at all upon
the merits of the suit for separation from bed and board, or for divorce, or upon
the actual or perspective outcome of the suit. The reason for this is that an order
to pay alimony pendente lite is merely an enforcement of the obligation of the
husband to support his wife as it exists under La. Civil Code art. 120, which
continues during the pendency of a suit for separation from bed and board or
for divorce and does not terminate until the marriage is dissolved either by death
or divorce.
Id. at 620.
119. LA. CIv. CODE art. 136.
120. See LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1960).
1983] 1039
LLOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
opportunity to draw upon the experiences of other states in solving
the problem of divorce for an interdict. The courts may hesitate to
depart from the majority trend by granting blanket approval for the
curator to interpose himself between the spouses and initiate a dissolu-
tion of the marriage. The structure of Louisiana's family and prop-
erty laws do not necessitate such a departure, as the curator may
protect the interdict's financial and property interests through parti-
tion, alimony pendente lite, or a contractual agreement to terminate
the community. Louisiana can protect the best interests of the inter-
dict by interpretation of its presertt statutory provisions. Within this
framework, Louisiana courts have been given the tools not only to
protect the interdict's assets but also to seek additional support for
the interdict in need and, given the proper grounds, to allow the action
for divorce by the curator when the acts of the opposing spouse have
been of such a nature as to prove offensive to both the interdicted
spouse and society.
Paul M. Adkins
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